The UN Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights (UNGPs) mark their 15th anniversary in 2026, having been adopted in 2011. Their first 15 years arrive amid a pendulum swing between regulation and deregulation.

As a result of developments in 2025, the European Union’s “Omnibus” package is expected to be approved in early 2026, achieving the objective of several governments and corporate lobbyists: to narrow the scope of the CSRD (Corporate Sustainability Reporting Directive) and the CSDDD (Corporate Sustainability Due Diligence Directive). As a result, the risk-based approach will become more of a general aspiration; companies will be required to report on their value chains “where necessary”; the obligation to develop climate transition plans will be removed; and the enforcement of these norms will be postponed for another year—until 2029—among other adjustments. How concerned should we be?

We might also point to the collapse of the UN Global Treaty on Plastics, the omission of fossil fuels in the final text agreed at COP30 in Brazil, and the shortcomings of the International Maritime Organization’s Net-Zero Framework. All of this unfolds as the United Nations enters a process of internal review—another symptom of a new crisis of multilateralism.

Is (de)regulation an indicator of failure for the United Nations system?

What we can say with certainty is that the UNGPs remain the most widely accepted normative framework when it comes to setting expectations for business conduct. For that reason alone, they are more relevant than ever. The more pressing question is: to what extent have the UNGPs achieved their objectives after 15 years of consensual adoption?

If the measure of success is the existence of national laws requiring companies to conduct human rights due diligence, then the objective could arguably be deemed unmet. However, we understand that the real objective is not just legal transposition, but the enabling and shaping of corporate behavior. Transforming the way companies are and act may, in fact, be the most immediate and meaningful goal.

At CREER, we propose a reinterpretation of the UNGPs—one that moves beyond short-term aims of shaping conduct through a “Do No Harm” lens. While the “Do No Harm” approach is unquestionably essential, it is clearly insufficient—especially in Latin American countries where ethnic diversity, rich biodiversity, and abundant natural resources (including strategic minerals and metals) are deeply affected by structural poverty, corruption, and criminal economies. Due diligence cannot be—or continue to be—an end in itself.

Perhaps to the “Do No Harm” paradigm we must add a “Positive Impact” approach. In doing so, the UNGPs could serve as a valuable framework for difficult but necessary conversations on energy poverty, technological and digital divides, economic, social, cultural, and environmental rights, and the equitable sharing of benefits.

It’s time to take stock: 2026 marks the 15th anniversary of the UNGPs. And with that milestone will come many—hopefully informed—opinions on their scope, limitations, and opportunities for improvement.

At CREER, we are ready to contribute to this global conversation, emphasizing the need for perspectives that look “beyond Europe” in both the Business and Human Rights agenda and the broader human rights movement. This may well be the right moment for Latin America to step forward as a key actor in the generation of knowledge and practice—shifting the focus from what happens solely within the European Council, Commission, and Parliament.

The emergence of new global and regional leadership coincides, in Latin America, with a significant shift in ideological orientations—reflected in recent and upcoming elections, both national and subnational, which appear to solidify this trend. This political turn is characterized by more nationalist, polarizing agendas that are critical of multilateralism, along with a deprioritization of human rights, climate policies, and social agendas.

In many countries, this shift has led to deregulation efforts, institutional weakening, and the shrinking of civic space, accompanied by narratives that portray international standards as external impositions or obstacles to growth. Within this context, the business and human rights agenda has seen a diminished capacity for public influence and legitimacy, while political, regulatory, and symbolic incentives for companies to make sustained progress on due diligence and responsible business practices have weakened.

This shift cannot be attributed solely to decisions made by Latin America’s political elites; it also reflects deeper and broader social dynamics. According to the AmericasBarometer (2023), only 59% of adults in Latin America express support for democracy—a sustained decline over the past decade that has yet to be reversed. Countries such as Argentina, Colombia, and Jamaica show some of the steepest declines, while concerns over freedom of expression are on the rise. In addition, public perception of corruption remains high. According to Transparency International (2024), the region continues to perform poorly in the Corruption Perceptions Index, and over the past decade, only Guyana and the Dominican Republic have shown sustained improvements. The combination of low democratic trust and high perceived corruption deepens polarization and erodes institutional legitimacy.

In light of this scenario, CREER will orient its 2026 work along two complementary lines of action. First, we aim to understand the narrative foundations of polarization in order to identify potential points of convergence between seemingly opposing actors—particularly between businesses and civil society organizations/NGOs—demonstrating that shared interests exist around territorial stability, employment, rule of law, and sustainability. Second, we will reaffirm that the respect for and fulfillment of human rights lies at the heart of business sustainability—not as an ideological agenda, but as a concrete guarantee for companies in terms of risk management, social legitimacy, legal certainty, and long-term viability in contexts marked by uncertainty and distrust.

Following a 2025 marked by geopolitical shifts—particularly between China and the United States—developing countries are gaining greater global relevance. Latin America plays a strategic role in the global renewable energy value chain. Around 65% of the energy produced in the region already comes from renewable sources, and its share in electricity generation is expected to continue growing. However, at the global level, the International Renewable Energy Agency warns that current deployment and investment levels in renewables are insufficient to meet the goal of tripling installed capacity to reach 11.2 TW by 2030. Achieving this would require adding 1,122 GW of annual capacity from 2025 onward and accelerating growth to 16.6% per year, in line with internationally agreed climate targets.

To reach these goals, the extraction of critical minerals—such as copper, nickel, rare earth elements, and graphite, among others—is essential, given their use in the construction of energy infrastructure and technologies. The region holds around one-third of global production and exports of strategic minerals for the energy transition, led by countries such as Chile, Peru, Argentina, and Brazil, which possess significant reserves. Demand for these minerals is expected to rise significantly, potentially attracting investments of up to USD 130 billion in mining and USD 24 billion in refining activities by 2040.

These goals and investments are unfolding in a regional context marked by structural challenges, including high levels of multidimensional poverty (including energy poverty), shifting regional geopolitics that affect climate agendas, persistent macroeconomic vulnerabilities, and the ongoing need to effectively integrate long-standing socio-environmental and human rights demands into public policy. In this scenario—amid the anticipated and rapid expansion of both renewable energy operations and mineral extraction—it is crucial to adequately manage the associated social, economic, environmental, and human rights risks and impacts, and to promote shared benefit mechanisms that can help move beyond the traditional extractivist model that has long dominated in Latin America.

In this context, the private sector will have a key role to play—not only in mobilizing capital but also in strengthening participatory governance, especially in settings where climate and energy agendas are highly polarized. However, such involvement demands the coherent integration of human rights principles and just transition frameworks—an essential condition for sustaining investment and consolidating low-carbon energy growth. Without this, uncertainty and weak legitimacy in company–community relations will persist, ultimately undermining project viability and social acceptance.

In 2026, CREER will promote and facilitate pragmatic discussions about the future of the renewable energy and transition minerals sectors in Latin America, with a central focus on due diligence and traceability across supply chains. From this perspective, we aim to contribute to strengthening territorial governance models and generating shared benefit mechanisms through multi-stakeholder dialogue—mechanisms that can collectively identify, manage, and remedy human rights risks and impacts, as well as socio-environmental conflicts that may arise in specific contexts related to the operation of these projects.

We aspire to support a just and sustainable energy transition through a systemic lens—one that acknowledges the dilemmas, nuances, and opportunities of global transformations and their regional and local impacts.

.

Ten years ago, 196 countries signed the Paris Agreement with the aim of limiting global warming and addressing climate change. Since then, multiple treaties and commitments have been adopted under various climate conventions. In November 2025, during COP30 held in Brazil, the Belém Action Mechanism (BAM) was launched—a new initiative aimed at collectively advancing a just, orderly, and equitable transition away from fossil fuels, with the goal of limiting global temperature rise to 1.5°C. This platform places at its center the communities and workers whose livelihoods depend on fossil fuels or carbon-intensive sectors. Although it was not possible to reach consensus on formal language explicitly referencing fossil fuel phase-out in the final COP outcomes, the diplomatic, political, and economic debate gained renewed momentum—both in international negotiations and in the public and media agendas.

Latin America is rich in natural resources such as oil, gas, and minerals, and has historically served as a primary exporter of raw materials for the global market. Many of its economies—affected by the so-called “Dutch disease”—rely heavily on extractive industry exports, as well as on the fiscal revenues and employment these industries generate, especially at the local level. However, persistent inequality, weak institutions, fragile governance, economic volatility, and corruption have significantly hindered the effective use of these resources for development, limiting economic diversification and the growth of other productive sectors. Compounding this is the high impact that extractive industries have had on the enjoyment of human rights in the territories where they operate.

Within this context, the decarbonization agenda in Latin America is advancing—marked by ambitious climate targets, the coexistence of emerging industries (particularly renewables) alongside extractive economic models, and the need for deep transformations of the economic system. These transformations are essential to move toward a development model that balances investment, public spending, and the multiple transitions required (including export, tax, and fiscal transitions) in order to reduce the social, economic, environmental, and human rights impacts that may result from the energy transition. While several countries in the region—such as Colombia, Brazil, Uruguay, and Mexico—have developed policy frameworks on Just Energy Transition that address the gradual phase-out of fossil fuels, only Chile has established a clear and defined plan through to 2040. As a result, major challenges remain in designing programs with measurable goals, binding instruments, and effective mechanisms for distributing the benefits associated with fossil fuel phase-out across the region.

At CREER, our work toward 2026 is grounded in a pragmatic perspective that recognizes the need to improve the quality of life of people and communities, to reduce energy poverty—understood as a human rights violation—and to acknowledge the ongoing role that extractive economies must play as enablers of a truly just transition. For this reason, we work to prepare regions for an orderly fossil fuel exit by integrating social, environmental, and human rights criteria into business planning for closure and divestment—through a participatory and multi-stakeholder approach. At the same time, we seek to strengthen the capacity of local communities to advance territorial governance and economic diversification. In doing so, we contribute to ensuring that the transition to carbon neutrality becomes a long-term opportunity for sustainable development.

The agricultural sector faces structural human rights challenges, reflected in economic, social, and environmental tensions on a global scale. Two recent developments illustrate this reality: in 2025, European farmers’ protests against the EU-Mercosur agreement revealed deep concerns over unfair competition and regulatory asymmetries. At the same time, in Latin America, the expansion of biofuels on fertile lands has raised ethical dilemmas related to food security and environmental justice.

In this context, the sectoral agenda is focused on resolving the tension between income generation in vulnerable communities and ecosystem conservation. For CREER, the bioeconomy represents a key alternative—a territorial development model that links the sustainable use of biological resources with scientific innovation. While such models promote economic growth and the protection of agricultural frontiers, they also face critical challenges, including the need to reduce dependence on external actors, improve access to finance, strengthen the technical capacities of local communities, and, above all, achieve sustained increases in productivity.

In transitioning territories seeking to move beyond dependence on extractive economies, agriculture is emerging as a driving force for productive diversification. Through strategies such as formalization, socio-ecological restoration, and community-based monitoring, sustainable resource management becomes possible. In this way, 2026 is shaping up to be a decisive year for consolidating local governance practices in Latin America that strike a balance between environmental protection and agricultural development—laying the foundation for a truly just transition.

The transition to low-carbon economies is entering its most concrete phase—through industrial closures or conversions, workforce retraining, new infrastructure, land-use changes, and the expansion of critical mineral supply chains. As these transformations advance, the central question is shifting from “how much investment is needed?” to “who pays, who benefits, and who bears the costs of the transition?”

The scale of the financial gap makes this an unavoidable issue. At the global level, climate finance reached approximately USD 1.9 trillion in 2023. However, the estimated needs for this decade are significantly higher: at least USD 6.3 trillion annually will be required between 2024 and 2030 (CPI, 2025). This gap will drive a rapid expansion in 2026 of financial instruments such as credit, bonds, blended finance, guarantees, and development banking—alongside more intense debates over conditions, metrics, and “taxonomies.”

For the business and human rights agenda, this is critical. The criteria used to allocate financing can either amplify human rights risks—such as mass layoffs without protections, informal labor, adverse impacts on communities and Indigenous Peoples, and socio-environmental conflicts—or they can promote better practices grounded in human rights respect. In 2026, pressure is expected to increase on banks and investors to demonstrate that they are integrating human rights due diligence into financial decision-making, and that they have effective grievance and remedy mechanisms in place.

At CREER, we advocate for a vision of transition finance that goes beyond simply “mobilizing capital toward green projects.” It must incorporate a rights-based approach that includes meaningful participation, social dialogue, social protection, and verifiable safeguards to ensure no one is left behind—aligning financial incentives with real outcomes for people, not just with carbon metrics.

In Latin America, criminal economies and transnational criminal organizations have undergone unprecedented expansion and sophistication over the past decade. These groups have moved beyond a model centered solely on drug trafficking to diversified criminal portfolios that now include deforestation, illegal gold mining, extortion, human trafficking, and migrant smuggling, among others. According to the Global Organized Crime Index (GI-TOC, 2023), Latin America and the Caribbean have become the region with the highest levels of organized crime in the world—facilitated by porous borders and chronic institutional weakness. The growing economic power of these networks has allowed them to consolidate a form of “criminal governance”, whereby they exercise de facto social and territorial control in areas where state presence is weak or nonexistent.

The scale of this phenomenon is striking. The Inter-American Development Bank (IDB) estimates that the direct and indirect costs of organized crime represent approximately 3.4% of the region’s GDP—a figure three times higher than the OECD average and greater than the public investment in education of several countries. However, the most critical impact is reflected in violence: although the region accounts for only 8% of the global population, it is home to nearly 33% of global homicides, according to UNODC data. The infiltration into the formal economy is a tangible reality: for instance, in Brazil, assets exceeding US$220 million have been traced to fuel supply chains linked to money laundering (AP, 2025); in Chile, reports of extortion linked to transnational gangs like Tren de Aragua increased by 938% in just four years, affecting the operations of small and medium-sized enterprises (CIPER, 2024).

Given the growing overlap between licit and illicit markets, the risks of infiltration into the private sector have become systemic. This requires companies to move beyond reactive compliance models toward advanced approaches of Enhanced Human Rights Due Diligence and multidimensional risk management. It is no longer sufficient to assess and mitigate risks in the immediate value chain; it is now imperative to anticipate and address territorial risks linked to the capture of markets by non-state actors.

In 2026, CREER will contribute to the development and consolidation of concrete examples of innovation in due diligence processes—integrating multi-stakeholder dialogue mechanisms that enable the co-creation of strategies for risk prevention and mitigation. This means that due diligence must move from being a bureaucratic obligation to becoming a strategic tool for structural prevention and transformation—essential to ensuring operational sustainability, traceability, and the integrity of global value chains.

The Amazon region represents perhaps one of the world’s most critical tensions between geological wealth and biodiversity.

Thanks to Guyana and Brazil, South America has become the fastest-growing oil-producing region globally, with projections of a one-third increase by 2030—surpassing the expected growth in the Middle East (one-quarter) and North America (one-tenth). The dilemma is that this new oil frontier is emerging in the Amazon River estuary—arguably the heart of the planet’s biodiversity. Brazil is adopting a pragmatic approach: it aims to generate oil revenues to finance its energy transition. On December 5, 2025, President Lula announced a roadmap to reduce Brazil’s dependence on fossil fuels. According to Brazil’s Energy Minister, the country aims to ensure short-term energy security and fiscal stability while financing long-term competitiveness in renewables. This may help explain Brazil’s influence in the decision to exclude fossil fuels from the final agreement reached at COP30 on climate change.

The Amazon is also a key region for strategic transition minerals. In addition to its historic association with gold—and the widespread illegality surrounding this activity—the mining agencies of Brazil and Colombia have identified the presence of copper, coltan, and molybdenum (in Colombia), and niobium, rare earth elements, and nickel (in Brazil).

At the same time, the Colombian Amazon accounts for 68.2% of the country’s total deforestation, with annual forest loss exceeding 112,000 hectares. Alarmingly, 62.5% of this habitat destruction occurs in protected areas, and 9% in national parks, driven by land grabbing, extensive cattle ranching, and illicit economies (Fundación Conservación y Desarrollo Sostenible, 2022). Corruption and organized crime have become endemic across the entire Amazon basin.

How can we foster a balanced, informed debate on the Amazon? Who should decide the future of the Amazon? Undoubtedly, the tension between biodiversity conservation and geological wealth must be resolved through collaborative efforts among the countries that share the Amazon biome—with the active leadership and participation of Indigenous Peoples who inhabit the region. COP30 in Brazil and its outcomes serve as a prelude to the critical debates anticipated in 2026 in Colombia around the proposed treaty on the non-proliferation of fossil fuels, with the Amazon as one of the central epicenters of that conversation.

Latin America and the Caribbean are experiencing accelerated urban growth that is pushing the ecological limits of vital ecosystems such as rivers, mangroves, and marine environments. In a region where more than 27% of the population lives in coastal areas, exposure to environmental changes and socio-economic tensions is critical. In this context, water ceases to be viewed as a mere “service” and becomes the living fabric upon which communities, wildlife, and multiple ecosystems depend.

The vulnerability of these territories is compounded by the convergence of extreme climate events and the expansion of high-impact economic activities. So-called “ocean industries”—which include port operations, logistics infrastructure, large-scale tourism, and offshore extractive projects (both fossil fuel and renewable energy)—create mounting pressures and cumulative harm. This development model not only generates economic losses and public health crises, but also sparks intense conflicts over land and water use, directly threatening 41 million people living in the region’s coastal zones.

In coastal and riverine areas, risk is systemic. Climate vulnerability is deeply intertwined with reliance on aquatic systems that sustain local knowledge, identities, and economies such as artisanal fishing and shellfish gathering. When industrial activities degrade or pollute these environments, the impacts go far beyond economics: social cohesion is fractured, and the very foundations of community survival are put at risk.

At the regional level, the scale of the challenge is evident in the more than 72,000 km of coastline across Latin America and the Caribbean. In urban areas, key threats—such as heatwaves (67%), flooding (57%), and water stress (47%)—are further exacerbated by institutional fragmentation and the economic pressure from sectors like logistics and tourism, which seek to occupy high-risk zones. In light of this, governments face an urgent need to coordinate with economic actors to implement “amphibious planning”: a decision-making strategy in which land use and economic activities are rigorously subordinated to the health and functioning of hydrological systems.

In 2026, we will contribute to the knowledge and practice of urban prosperity rooted in healthy and functional socio-ecological systems—emphasizing the interdependence between ecosystems, human rights, and the economy.

As digital environments become embedded in all spheres of daily life and technological innovation outpaces States’ ability to regulate its impacts, new risks to human rights are emerging. For the Business and Human Rights agenda, this digital boom represents both a turning point and a blind spot: risks are no longer confined to territorial dynamics or traditional business practices—they now reside in the code, platforms, and infrastructures that remain invisible to most workers and consumers. In 2026, addressing these challenges will require a deep understanding of how these systems are designed, developed, and deployed—and how they shape our social, environmental, and labor dynamics.

It is estimated that over 85% of companies in Latin America use artificial intelligence in at least one of their processes, while in countries like Colombia, the digital divide reaches 38.4%. Within the same ecosystem, one part of the population automates tasks using AI, while another remains excluded from basic connectivity. In this context, digital environments—from social media and AI systems to service platforms and digital banking—present multidimensional risks: labor precarity driven by algorithmic control, discrimination due to automated bias, mass disinformation and induced polarization, violations of privacy and personal data, and even hidden environmental costs, with significant carbon and water footprints required to sustain data centers built with critical minerals.

At CREER, we approach this challenge as part of our broader transition agenda, leading evidence-based discussions on the responsible development and use of these technologies. We advocate for democratic, accountable, and sustainable tech governance that brings Latin American voices into the design of platforms and into the decision-making processes that govern them. Our approach seeks to turn AI and other digital environments into tools capable of generating collective positive impact.

The future of the business and human rights agenda depends on making the invisible visible—especially in the digital realm—and on transforming potential risks into opportunities for everyone.