The legal process against Maduro will not take the form of an international trial but rather a domestic indictment in the United States, primarily on charges related to drug trafficking and money laundering—charges quite distant from those that could be brought against the Venezuelan regime for its systematic violations of human rights and democratic principles, long upheld and accepted in Latin America.

What Trump did mention—repeatedly—was his economic motivation and his personal interest in Venezuelan oil. In just a matter of hours, it seems, the U.S. self-appointed itself as manager of the world’s largest oil reserves, giving it an edge in meeting its energy needs and in gaining ground against China. 2026 could turn out to be a financial boom year for the U.S., thanks to Venezuela.

After several decades of the international system failing to foster internal change in Venezuela, the images of Maduro’s capture were unprecedented news—especially in Colombia. As a neighboring country, Colombia has suffered the consequences of the Venezuelan regime: not only a multi-year wave of migration, but also over a decade of delayed progress in consolidating its rule of law, as Venezuela has served as a safe haven for Colombian illegal armed groups and as a corridor for transnational organized crime. Far from weakening illegal armed groups, Venezuela has functioned as a space that strengthens them, contributing to a clear crisis of security and stability. Still, Maduro’s ousting does not mean the end of chavismo—at least, not yet.

While this development may have positive indirect effects for Colombia and the wider Latin American region in terms of relative stability, it also brings significant risks: a complete breach of the international law principle of non-intervention in internal affairs, including the prohibition on the use of force, and the precedent it sets for future similar U.S. interventions in the region. It could also serve as justification for other powers—such as China in relation to Taiwan or Russia in relation to Ukraine—to act unilaterally in foreign territories, once again invoking a “might makes right” scenario.

At CREER, we are committed to generating knowledge and practical pathways for overcoming the false dichotomy between economic growth and social well-being; between business activity and equity. We are also invested in examining transitions in countries that move from one political state to another—as seems to be the case now in Venezuela. Such transitions will only be sustainable and legitimate if they are just. How just the Venezuelan transition will be is a matter of deep concern to us and will depend on which dimensions of justice are prioritized.

There is no clarity yet about the conditions under which decisions about Venezuela’s transition will be made.
What role will the Venezuelan people play in determining their future? What role will the international community take? What kind of companies will operate in Venezuela going forward, and what types of investments will flow in? Whose demand will Venezuelan oil be used to satisfy? Will the benefits be distributed equitably, ideally enabling Venezuelans themselves to improve their living conditions? Who will set the terms? How much will this transition affect the rest of the region? What role will Venezuela and its gradual transition play in the broader geopolitical reconfiguration, where Latin America, Africa, and Southeast Asia are striving to move from being mere spectators to active players in the global political and economic arena?

As the days—and likely years—bring greater clarity to these questions, at CREER we remain committed to processes and models of dialogue, rather than unilateral or force-based decisions. We stand firm in our belief in international law, the human rights movement, and constitutional democracies. These frameworks uphold the values and principles of coexistence, without which reality would be even more difficult.

We choose to remain in that sometimes uncomfortable space—because if international law and the expectation of respecting human dignity make people uncomfortable, perhaps it means they still serve as guardrails. A recent example is the Omnibus legislation in the European Union, which shows that what is legislated still matters to States—including the U.S.—and to economic actors. If international law and the principles of human dignity ceased to be inconvenient, that would be a far greater cause for concern. Irrelevance and invisibility would be true signs of failure. The rules of the game must apply to everyone and cannot be optional.

We will advocate for a genuinely just transition in Venezuela, and we hope that the current wave of investment and business interest will not only serve to satisfy the hunger of private—foreign—interests, but will also bring well-being to a population that has disproportionately endured the consequences of an anti-rights and anti-democratic regime for decades.

It is often said, in an optimistic tone, that “after the storm comes the calm”; or, in a more cynical tone, that “after the party comes the hangover.” If our main concern is a Venezuela that is once again democratic, prosperous, and a key player in the region, let us hope that Maduro’s capture leads to calm—and not a hangover.